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The oil sector has been the major element of Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. The years 
2013–2015 saw a significant increase in the volume of crude oil exported by Russia. In 2015, 
China became the main importer of Russian oil; Russia became the second largest supplier of 
oil to the Chinese market, after Saudi Arabia. From Beijing’s perspective, supplies of Russian 
oil are of strategic importance because the main supply routes are overland routes. Russia, 
for its part, is interested in boosting its export because of its deteriorating position on the 
European market, which hitherto has been considered a strategic market.
Cooperation in the field of natural gas has been less advanced; so far Russia has exported 
only insignificant amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to China. China is less dependent on 
the import of gas (its own production covers around 70% of the demand). Beijing has been 
dynamically developing its LNG infrastructure, and has at its disposal gas pipelines which 
connect China with producer countries in Central Asia. Additionally, all the projects carried 
out within the framework of Russian-Chinese gas cooperation are being hampered by the 
financial problems Moscow is experiencing. 
Energy cooperation is and will remain the most important component of Russian-Chinese 
economic relations. In the present form of this cooperation, Russia has mainly played the role 
of China’s oil base. The process of Chinese companies investing in oil production in Russia is 
progressing more slowly than before; most of the agreements made regarding this matter 
are still framework agreements. In the mid-term perspective, however, a qualitative change to 
the present model should be expected. It is very likely that Chinese companies will enter the 
Russian upstream sector, especially taking into account the financial standing of the Russian 
energy sector and China’s interest in gaining direct access to oil fields.
This text focuses on the oil and gas sector. Coop-
eration in the electrical energy sector has been 
rather inert, and is limited to Russia selling rela-
tively small amounts of electrical energy to China. 
Pursuant to the contract signed in 2012, Inter RAO 
exports electrical energy to the Chinese market1.
1 The contract has been signed for 25 years and envisages 
a total export of 100 billion kWh. In 2014, the export 
volume was 3788 million kWh (an increase of 3.6% 
against 2013) worth US$164 million (a drop of 11.9% 
against 2013, when the figure was US$186 million). In 
the first three quarters of 2015, Russia’s export was 
2618 kWh, worth US$135 million. http://www.ved.gov.ru
Record high crude oil supplies 
The dynamics in Russian-Chinese energy coop-
eration are reflected mainly in the significant 
increase in the volume of crude oil supplies 
from Russia to China (from 24.4 million tonnes 
in 2013 to 41.29 million tonnes in 2015). Russia’s 
state-controlled oil company Rosneft has been 
the biggest supplier. Its export to Chinese con-
tractors recorded an almost two-fold increase, 
from 16.55 million tonnes in 2013 to 30.3 mil-
lion tonnes annually in 2015 (for detailed fig-
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ures see the Appendix). The main export chan-
nel is the branch of the East Siberia–Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, running to China. 
Half of the oil exported by Rosneft is currently 
supplied via this branch. The rest of the supplies 
reach China via the Kozmino sea terminal and 
as part of swap transactions with Kazakhstan 
(Rosneft supplies around 7 million tonnes an-
nually to northern regions of Kazakhstan, and 
in exchange Kazakhstan supplies its own oil to 
China using the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline2). 
China’s import of crude oil is well-diversified. 
The share of each individual supplier in this im-
port does not exceed 20%. From Beijing’s per-
spective, the supplies of oil from Russia have 
privileged status due to their strategic impor-
tance. The major portion of the oil China im-
ports is supplied via an overland pipeline which 
connects the two countries with no transit 
states between them. This makes it possible 
to reduce the share of oil imported from the 
Middle East, which currently accounts for more 
than a half of total oil imported by China. The 
Middle East is increasingly exposed to geopoliti-
cal turbulence. Similarly, the maritime oil supply 
routes run through several ‘bottlenecks’, mainly 
the Strait of Malacca, which would be easy to 
block in case of a conflict. The years 2013–2015 
saw an increase in the importance of the share 
of oil imported from Russia in the total volume 
of oil which China imports. In 2013, Russia as 
2 The agreement provides for the possible increase in the 
volume of transported oil to 10 million tonnes annually. 
The relevant agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan 
was signed on 24 December 2013.
a supplier was ranked fourth (8.6% of China’s 
total import), whereas in 2015 it was ranked 
second (12.3%)3.
On one hand, numerous factors in China are 
fostering an increase in the import of crude oil 
from Russia. First, the Chinese domestic market 
is applying a mechanism of administrative con-
trol on the prices of petroleum products which 
links these prices to global oil prices. In reaction 
to the drop in the price of oil, in January 2016 
price brackets between US$40 and US$130 per 
barrel were introduced (when the price falls be-
low US$40, Chinese oil extraction is no longer 
profitable for the producers). In practice, this 
means that oil companies, in particular Sinopec 
and CNPC (PetroChina), are allowed to sell pe-
troleum products at a price much higher than 
the global price, thereby boosting their reve-
nues. Additionally, the Chinese leadership has 
allowed numerous small refineries to operate in 
the oil processing sector. Another factor boost-
ing China’s demand for crude oil has been the 
creation of strategic reserves by Beijing. China 
intends to create reserves by 2020 which would 
cover a 100-day demand for oil. Chinese re-
serves are currently (early 2016) estimated at 
a volume able to cover a 29-day demand.
Russia has been interested in increasing its ex-
ports to China. One of the main reasons behind 
this are the negative trends observed on the Eu-
ropean market (a gradual decrease in Russia’s 
export recorded in 2011–2014), which hitherto 
has been considered a strategic market. Anoth-
er reason involves long-term forecasts regard-
ing the consumption of crude oil in Europe, 
which are unfavourable to Russia. 
On the other hand, however, one of the barriers 
to a continuing dynamic increase in the export 
of Russian oil to China may be infrastructur-
al problems and delays in exploring the fields 
which are intended to be the raw material base 
for new supplies. Pursuant to an agreement 
3 In some months of 2015, supplies from Russia exceeded 
those from Saudi Arabia.
The dynamics of Russian-Chinese ener-
gy cooperation is best illustrated main-
ly by the rapid increase in the volume of 
Russia’s crude oil supplies to China (from 
24.4 million tonnes in 2013 to 41.29 mil-
lion tonnes in 2015).
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signed in 2013, Rosneft committed itself to 
double its export to China, from 15.8 million 
tonnes in 2013 to 30 million tonnes annually in 
2018–2030. This increase in the volume of sup-
plies should have been effected via the ESPO 
pipeline branch. However, due to delays in con-
structing the infrastructure, which according 
to the Russian media were caused by China, 
the increased supplies were delivered via the 
Kozmino sea terminal and in swap operations 
with Kazakhstan. Transneft announced a plan 
to expand the capacity of the ESPO pipeline 
from the present 58 million tonnes to 80 mil-
lion tonnes in 2020. Similarly, there are plans 
to expand the Kozmino sea terminal to reach 
a capacity of 36 million tonnes annually by 
2017 (according to Transneft, an expansion to 
exceed 36 million tonnes would not be possible 
for technical reasons). If further delays prevent 
Rosneft from increasing its export to China us-
ing the ESPO pipeline, the rivalry between Ros-
neft and other Russian oil exporters over export 
quotas enabling the supplies of oil via Kozmino 
is likely to increase. For Russian oil-producing 
companies, the Kozmino port has been a rela-
tively profitable export channel. 
The waning ‘Powers of Siberia’:  
increasing problems of gas pipeline projects
So far, Russian-Chinese cooperation in imple-
menting joint gas pipeline projects has been 
much less successful.
The construction of the Power of Siberia-1 
gas pipeline has been experiencing repeated 
problems (the project is intended to enable 
the export of Russian gas from Eastern Siberi-
an fields to China). In 2015, Gazprom launched 
the construction of a new pipeline4, but at the 
same time it repeatedly changed its plans re-
garding the deadline for finishing the works 
and launching the supplies. Back in December 
2014, Gazprom representatives suggested that 
the maximum contractual volume of supplies 
agreed in May 2014 (38 bcm of gas annually) 
would be reached in 20245. However, in May 
2015, during a special news conference focus-
ing on Gazprom’s strategy in South-East Asia, it 
was mentioned that this level could be reached 
in 2024–2031. The planned route of the con-
structed Power of Siberia pipeline has also been 
changed. Originally, the pipeline was intended 
to connect the Eastern Siberian Kovykta and 
Chayanda fields with Blagoveshchensk, and 
further with Khabarovsk and Vladivostok (see 
Map). A statement published by Russia’s Ener-
gy Ministry in February 2015 suggests that the 
project no longer involves the construction of 
the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok section, which is 
likely to be a consequence of Gazprom’s with-
drawal from its plan to build an LNG terminal in 
Vladivostok.
The Power of Siberia-1 pipeline has experienced 
financial problems regarding the expansion 
of its infrastructure. Real investment expen-
ditures for the construction of the Power of 
Siberia pipeline were included in Gazprom’s 
budget only in 2015, and their amount is insig-
nificant (30.98 billion roubles, which accounts 
for a mere 7% of total funds earmarked by 
Gazprom for investments involving the con-
struction of gas pipelines). Back in the summer 
of 2015, plans were made to invest around 
200 billion roubles in the construction of the 
Power of Siberia during 2016. However, in Jan-
4 The first section of the pipeline from Chayanda to the 
city of Lensk (208 km) is to be constructed by Stroytrans-
gaz (according to information provided by Gazprom, in 
2015 about 50–60 km of the pipeline had been built).
5 Проектный объем поставок газа в Китай по “Силе 
Сибири” будет достигнут в 2024 году, http://tass.ru/
ekonomika/1644464 (10 January 2016). 
It should be expected that the launching 
of the Power of Siberia-1 pipeline will be 
delayed, and that a decision to build Pow-
er of Siberia-2 will remain in the sphere of 
plans, similarly to other initiatives.
4OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 197
uary 2016 the planned amount was reduced to 
a mere 92 billion roubles. In December 2015, 
Gazprom cancelled tenders for the construc-
tion of around 800 km of the gas pipeline. The 
official reason behind this decision was reser-
vations raised by the Russian Federal Antitrust 
Service, although the true cause might have 
been Gazprom’s difficult financial standing. 
Equally surprising is the fact that Gazprom has 
not yet updated the most recent total cost cal-
culation regarding the construction of the new 
pipeline, which was prepared in 2011 (at that 
time, the cost of constructing 3246 km of the 
pipeline was estimated at 800 billion roubles). 
Secondly, another important factor involves 
serious delays in exploring the gas fields in-
tended to be the project’s raw material base. 
Gazprom had already taken account of these 
delays at the present stage of project imple-
mentation. The Chayandinskoye gas field is ex-
pected to reach its maximum output (22 bcm 
of gas annually) no sooner than 2022, whereas 
the Kovyktinskoye field is expected to increase 
its production from the planned 5 bcm of gas 
annually in 2022–2023 to 13 bcm of gas annu-
ally in 2024–2031. At the same time, Gazprom 
representatives have indicated that the agree-
ment with CNPC provides for the possibility 
to delay the launch of supplies for three years, 
which means that the deliveries will most likely 
be launched in 2021 (originally, the first deliver-
ies were scheduled for 2018). 
Thirdly, China has been less interested in im-
porting gas from Russia than in importing Rus-
sian oil. On the one hand, the Chinese econo-
my has been less dependent on the import of 
gas. In 2014, China imported 31% of the natural 
gas it consumed, i.e. 58 bcm (total consump-
tion was 183 bcm). The capacity of the present 
pipelines running from Central Asian countries 
and Burma is 70 bcm, and is expected to rise 
to 90 bcm by the end of the present decade. 
In 2014, China used only 50% of this capacity, 
importing just 31 bcm. In 2015, the volumes of 
gas consumption and import remained largely 
the same` , and reached 191 bcm and 62 bcm 
respectively. This is to be supplemented by the 
increasing capacity of LNG terminals which Chi-
na uses to import less than 50% of its gas. Even 
if the planned Power of Siberia pipeline is fully 
used, supplies from Russia would account for 
half of the planned import from Central Asian 
countries, and would have to compete with 
supplies of liquefied gas.
Despite the above-mentioned difficulties and 
the unavoidable delays, the Power of Siberia-1 
pipeline will eventually be constructed because 
both sides are truly interested in its completion. 
Russia treats the gas infrastructure currently 
being expanded as an important element of 
the programme of gasification of Eastern Sibe-
ria and the Far East. China, for its part, is mainly 
interested in covering the regional demand for 
gas in the north-eastern part of the country. In 
December 2015, this region experienced prob-
lems with ‘unloading’ LNG, as a result of which 
CNPC was forced to reduce its supplies to some 
of its industrial recipients.
However, there is still little progress in the ne-
gotiations over the Power of Siberia-2 project 
(formerly the Altai project), which involves 
the construction of a gas pipeline to connect 
Russia’s Western Siberian fields with China’s 
north-western provinces. Gazprom has been 
pushing this project forward since 2006. Its im-
plementation would enable Russia to strength-
en its negotiating position towards its Europe-
an clients; the raw material base for the supplies 
would involve the same fields which contain 
gas supplied to European recipients (according 
to Gazprom, these are mainly the Zapolyarnoye 
field [3.3 trillion m3 of gas] and the Yuzhnoruss-
China is less interested in importing gas 
from Russia than in importing oil.
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koye field [1.03 trillion m3 of gas])6. So far, only 
a series of framework agreements concerning 
the project has been made7. It should be re-
membered that the Russian leadership and Gaz-
prom representatives have repeatedly suggest-
ed that the contract could have been signed in 
2015, although its conclusion in the upcoming 
months is increasingly less likely. 
From Beijing’s perspective, the biggest obsta-
cle to the construction of the pipeline’s west-
ern section involves the need to deliver gas to 
locations along the eastern and the southern 
coast, which are separated by a distance of sev-
eral thousand kilometres. The present network 
within the Chinese West-East Pipelines (WEP) 
is composed of three branches with a capacity 
of 77 bcm (including 60 bcm for Central Asian 
gas and 17 bcm for gas extracted in Xinjiang). 
The planned fourth and fifth branches are ex-
pected to reach their total capacity of up to 
50 bcm (including 25 bcm for Central Asian gas, 
and the remaining portion for the gas from Xin-
jiang). The Altai gas pipeline would require the 
construction of a sixth branch.
The programme of expanding LNG terminals 
which Beijing has been dynamically implement-
ing can be considered another factor strength-
ening China’s negotiating position in the talks 
over the import of gas from Russia.In 2013–2015, 
6 In August 2014, President Vladimir Putin announced 
that under the Eastern Gas Programme gas networks in 
western and eastern regions of Russia will be connect-
ed, however, in May 2015, during a news conference, 
Gazprom representatives said that these concepts were 
no longer valid and are economically unprofitable.
7 The most recent general agreements were signed in 
Beijing in November 2014 and in Moscow in May 2015, 
respectively. 
up to 11 LNG terminals, with a total regasifica-
tion capacity of 32.4 million tonnes, were put 
into operation. This means that at the beginning 
of 2016 China was running 17 terminals with 
a total regasification capacity of 54.6 million 
tonnes annually (see Appendix: Table 1). 
Framework agreements in the oil  
and gas production sector
So far, China’s involvement in the Russian 
production sector has been insignificant (see 
Appendix: Table 2). Over the last two years, 
Moscow has become more determined to en-
courage Chinese capital to invest in the Russian 
production sector. In September 2014, Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin announced that Russia 
would be willing to offer Chinese companies 
shares in strategic oil and gas deposits8. In Feb-
ruary 2015, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Ark-
ady Dvorkovich said that this offer could even 
involve controlling stakes9. 
So far, most of the agreements regarding Chi-
na’s investments in oil production projects in 
Russia have been framework agreements, al-
though it is likely that some of them will be fi-
nalised. Rosneft has been particularly interested 
in attracting Chinese capital. Back in 2013, Ros-
neft offered CNPC shares in the Taas-Yuryakh 
Neftegazodobycha company which operates 
the Srednebotuobinskoye gas field (Eastern Si-
beria), although as yet no final deal has been 
struck10. In November 2014, Rosneft signed 
8 Russia’s President has said that “for our Chinese friends there 
are no limits”. Для китайских друзей ограничений нет, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/09/01/6199073.shtml
9 Дворкович пообещал Китаю контроль над российской 
нефтью, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015 
/03/01/neft-techet-v-kitai. Pursuant to the current regula-
tions in force in Russia, foreign companies are free to pur-
chase packages not exceeding 10% of shares in production 
projects; in early 2015 the Ministry of Natural Resources 
prepared a proposal to increase this limit to 25%, and to 
49% with consent from the authorities. According to Rus-
sian law, strategic fields are those which contain at least 70 
million tonnes of oil or 50 bcm of gas.
10 In early 2015, Rosneft signed a preliminary agreement 
for the sale of 20% of shares in this company to the Brit-
ish company BP.
So far, most of the agreements regard-
ing Chinese investments in oil upstream 
projects in Russia are framework agree-
ments, however, it is likely that some of 
them will be finalised.
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a framework agreement on the purchase by 
the Chinese CNPC company of 10% of shares 
in the Vankor oil field located in Krasnoyarsk 
krai and owned by Rosneft. In September 2015, 
Rosneft entered into an agreement with the 
Chinese petroleum processing company Sino-
pec on cooperation in exploring Russia’s Russ-
koye and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye oil fields 
in Eastern Siberia (the agreement grants 49% 
of shares in each field to the Chinese partner). 
The oil from the Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye 
field is to be exported to China via the ESPO 
pipeline. Although these transactions look very 
promising, their finalisation might be delayed. 
Rosneft’s negotiating position has recently 
been weakened due to the Western sanctions 
against Russia, which have limited Moscow’s 
access to Western capital.
Any tightening of Russian-Chinese relations in 
the gas production sector in the coming years is 
rather unlikely. On one hand, Gazprom has ex-
pressed its interest in cooperation in this area, as 
evidenced by general agreements signed with 
Chinese companies, such as the memorandum 
signed with CNOOC in November 2014 and the 
framework cooperation agreement signed with 
CNPC on 8 May 2015. On the other hand, an-
nouncements by Gazprom representatives sug-
gest that the participation of Chinese compa-
nies in production projects in Russia would be 
possible only if Gazprom were granted similar 
operation opportunities in China, which seems 
very unlikely in the coming years. 
As far as possible projects to be implemented by 
Chinese companies and Rosneft are concerned, 
the fact that Rosneft has no licence to export 
gas might be a problem (so far, Gazprom has 
had a monopoly on the export of gas via the 
pipeline system, granted to it by the relevant 
law). Back in 2014, President Putin ordered the 
government to devise a plan to grant the so-
called independent gas producers access to ex-
port pipelines, but the difficult financial stand-
ing of the Russian energy sector (including 
Gazprom itself) could delay the final decision on 
this matter for several years at least. Moreover, 
the major Eastern Siberian gas fields owned 
by Rosneft, the Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye 
field (around 152.4 bcm of gas) and the Sred-
nebotuobinskoye field (around 155 bcm), are 
located far away from the planned route of 
the Power of Siberia pipeline (the distance 
between the Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye field 
and the planned pipeline is around 1000 km). 
Cooperation in the LNG sector:  
moderate progress 
So far, Russian-Chinese cooperation in the LNG 
sector has been limited to Gazprom exporting 
a minor volume of liquefied gas to China, and 
to China’s involvement in the implementation 
of the Yamal-LNG project. 
Despite the fact that Russian supplies of LNG to 
China were launched in 2009, their volume con-
tinues to be insignificant. In 2012–2014, it grad-
ually decreased (0.38 million tonnes in 2012 
and a mere 0.13 million tonnes in 2014). China 
is therefore not a significant market for Russian 
LNG (it accounts for 1.2% of total Russian LNG 
export). Similarly, for China the Russian lique-
fied gas is not an important source of supplies, 
as it accounts for a mere 0.65% of China’s total 
LNG import. 
Russia’s most promising liquefied gas project, 
the so-called Yamal-LNG, has experienced ma-
jor problems regarding sources of funding. 
The project’s shareholders include Novatek, 
Russia’s second largest gas producer after Gaz-
prom (50.1%), the French company Total (20%), 
the Chinese company CNPC (20%) and the Chi-
nese Silk Road Fund (9.9%). In May 2014, CNPC 
signed an agreement with the consortium for 
Any tightening of Russian-Chinese rela-
tions in the gas upstream in the coming 
years seems rather unlikely.
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the purchase of 3 million tonnes of LNG an-
nually. Only to a limited extent were external 
sources of funding obtained for the project (ac-
cording to the original plans, they were to have 
accounted for 70% of the total budget, now 
estimated at US$27 billion). Novatek is subject 
to sanctions, and has limited opportunities to 
obtain capital from Western or Russian banks11. 
The company has only managed to win support 
in the form of 150 billion roubles from the Rus-
sian National Welfare Fund by selling its bonds 
to state-owned banks: it obtained 75 billion 
roubles (around US$ 1.2 billion at the exchange 
rate of that time) for the bonds it sold on 19 
February 2015; the second portion of bonds, 
worth 75 billion roubles, was sold in Septem-
ber 2015. Russia expects to obtain the missing 
funds (around US$12–14 billion) from loans 
from Chinese banks; so far only preliminary 
agreements have been made regarding this is-
sue. By now, the Chinese side has offered a loan 
amounting to a mere €730 million.
In the present conditions, the implementation 
of new Far Eastern LNG projects to supply the 
Chinese market seems rather unlikely. Due to 
financial difficulties, these projects are likely 
to be considerably delayed, and some of them 
even abandoned, such as the Vladivostok LNG 
(implemented by Gazprom) or the Far Eastern 
LNG (implemented by Rosneft) projects. Similar-
ly, the fact that the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field in 
Sakhalin has been subject to American sanctions 
is likely to delay the plans to expand the liquefy-
ing plant under the Sakhalin-2 project (this field 
was intended to be the raw material base for the 
planned third branch of the terminal). 
11 Gazprombank and Vneshekonombank were expected to 
offer loans for this project, but they were covered by 
Western financial sanctions, which considerably wors-
ened their financial standing. 
Prospects for the development 
of energy cooperation
There has been dynamic progress in cooperation 
in increasing the volume of supplies of crude oil. 
However, Russian and Chinese companies have 
been unable to close any agreement regarding 
investments in the oil production sector for over 
a decade. The biggest suspected obstacle to in-
creasing the volume of exports of Russian oil to 
China can be associated with the existing poten-
tial for extracting oil in Eastern Siberia. In this sit-
uation, the future development of cooperation 
could involve specifically Chinese investments in 
the upstream. These investments are likely to be 
fostered by both the rising political importance 
of cooperation with China as perceived by Russia 
and the growing financial needs of the Russian 
oil sector, in particular if the sanctions imposed 
by the West remain in force.
In the case of the gas sector, the prospects for 
launching exports of Russian gas via the pipeline 
system, which would boost Russia’s importance 
in China’s eyes, remain less promising. It should 
be expected that the launch of the Power of Si-
beria-1 pipeline will be delayed, and that a deci-
sion to construct Power of Siberia-2 will remain 
in the realm of plans, similar to other initiatives 
(involving, for example, the project to export 
gas via the system of pipelines from Sakhalin 
to China). Equally uncertain is the participation 
of Chinese companies in gas upstream projects 
carried out in Russia. In this context, the most 
promising area of cooperation involves the LNG 
sector, mainly the implementation of the Yamal 
project. This cooperation could gain new qual-
ity if big loans (in the amount of between ten 
and twenty billion US dollars) were granted by 
Chinese banks for the purpose of implementing 
the Yamal-LNG project.
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Appendix
Table 1. Operating and planned LNG terminals in China
2012 2015 2017 (planned)
Number of operating terminals 7 18 22 
Total regasification capacity of the operating terminals (in million tonnes) 22.2 54.6 64.6
Authors’ own analysis, based on figures published in World LNG Report 2015.
Table 2. China’s involvement in the production sector in Russia
Chinese partner sector Russian 
partner
Type of involvement 
CNPC oil Rosneft Vostok Energy Ltd.; exploration of resources of Verkhneicherskoye 
and Zapadno-Chonskoye fields located in Irkutsk oblast (Eastern Siberia)
gas Novatek 20% of shares in the Yamal-LNG project 
Sinopec oil Rosnieft Participation in the Sakhalin-3 project (25.1%); exploration of the Veninsky block
oil Rosnieft 49% of shares in the Udmurtneft company; oil production 
(around 6.5 million tonnes annually)
Authors’ own analysis, based on figures published by news agencies Argus and Interfax.
Table 3. Export of Russian crude oil to China in 2013–2015 (in million tonnes)
 Exporter 2013 2014 2015
via the Kozmino port Rosneft 0.9 2.2 7.3
Surgutnieftiegaz 2.2 1.4 3.6
Gazpromneft 0.1 0.6 1.2
minor producers 1.3 1.5 2.21
TNK-BP 0.9 0 0
LUKoil 0.2 0.1 0.64
Total 5.6 5.8 14.95
via the ESPO branch Rosneft 15.75 15.6 16
via Kazakhstan Rosneft 0 7 7
other routes companies total 3.35 4.7 3.32
total (all routes) companies total 24.4 33.1 41.29
Authors’ own analysis, based on figures published by news agencies Argus and Interfax.
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